BYOK and HYOK. Your buyer intelligence, under a key you control.
Bring your own key or hold your own key. In both models HiveSilo asks your key manager to wrap and unwrap the data keys that protect your buyer data. You grant the use, you can revoke it, and you audit it in your own logs.
Start with a conversation. No client records needed.

Two acronyms, one question: who can switch access off?
BYOK and HYOK both put a key you control between a vendor and your data. They differ in where the key material lives and who keeps it running.
Which model does your policy actually require?
Buyer intelligence from your own website shows which accounts are in market. Security teams increasingly ask that vendor-held data like this sits under a customer managed key, so the client can end access without waiting for the vendor.
The key managers already do the hard part. AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS and HashiCorp Vault each document how an application wraps a data key under a key it cannot read. This page explains the two models in the vendors' own terms, and what each one asks of you.
A BYOK / HYOK review should start with what your policy actually requires: a customer managed key, or key material held outside the cloud provider. [P711-D03] [P711-D10] [HS3] [HS4]
Choose where the key lives. The control stays yours either way.
HiveSilo is a caller of your key manager. It does not ask you to change how you run keys, and it works with the model your policy names.
Talk through your use case- BYOK or HYOK.
- Decide whether the key may live in a cloud key manager you control or must stay in a key manager you operate yourself.
- Who may use it.
- Grant wrap and unwrap to one named HiveSilo identity, with the access controls your key manager already provides.
- What happens on revocation.
- Agree in advance who can revoke, and that your tenant's data is unreadable until access is restored.
AvailableCustomer managed keys are available and are activated for each client on request, against a key in that client's own key manager, with the model, the key and the permissions their administrator approves.
How HiveSilo works with BYOK and HYOK
BYOK and HYOK both put a key you control between HiveSilo and your data. Your key manager (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS or HashiCorp Vault) wraps and unwraps the data keys that protect your tenant's data, through its documented API, under access you grant. HiveSilo only asks for wrap and unwrap and never holds the key. You can revoke access yourself, and each use is recorded in your own logs. [P711-D01] [P711-D05] [P711-D09] [P711-D11] [HSF1] [HS3]
What your security team sees in its own audit log
- Operation
- Unwrap data key
- Key identifier
- a1b2…
- Caller
- The HiveSilo identity your administrator granted
- Time
- 2026-11-11 14:02:07 UTC
- Result
- Allowed
How to read it
One data key was unwrapped for your tenant.
The entry names the operation, the key, the caller and the time. It carries no buyer record, name or contact detail. After you revoke access, the same request is refused by your key manager.
What HiveSilo sends and the route BYOK documents
The key managers covered are AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS and HashiCorp Vault. Every row names what those vendors document. HiveSilo calls your key manager outbound, only to wrap and unwrap data keys, and never holds the key. It asks for no permission to manage keys or access rules and does not read your audit logs.
| What HiveSilo asks for | In your key manager | Documented route |
|---|---|---|
| Wrap a data key that protects your tenant's data | Your key encrypts the data key and returns the wrapped value | Azure Key Vault: POST {vaultBaseUrl}/keys/{key-name}/{key-version}/wrapkey. Google Cloud KMS: a key encryption key wraps a locally generated data key. Vault: the transit engine returns a data key encrypted with a named key. [P711-D05] [P711-D09] [P711-D11] |
| Unwrap a data key when your data has to be read | Your key decrypts the wrapped data key | AWS KMS: the Decrypt operation recovers a data key that was encrypted under your KMS key, named by its key ARN when it is in another account. Google Cloud KMS: the key encryption key unwraps the data key. [P711-D01] [P711-D09] |
| Use of key material you generated yourself (BYOK import) | Your imported key, held in the cloud key manager | AWS KMS imports key material into a KMS key created without it. Azure imports from a supported on-premises HSM into Key Vault Premium or Managed HSM. Vault transit supports key import. [P711-D02] [P711-D06] [P711-D11] |
| Use of a key that never leaves your own key manager (HYOK) | Your external key manager performs the operation | AWS external key stores: the same AWS KMS APIs, served by your external key manager through your proxy. Google Cloud External Key Manager: Cloud KMS contacts your external key manager for each request. [P711-D03] [P711-D10] |
| A record of each use | Your own audit log | AWS CloudTrail, Azure Key Vault AuditEvent logging, and Vault audit devices. Google advises enabling audit logging in the external key manager when using Cloud EKM. [P711-D04] [P711-D08] [P711-D10] [P711-D12] |
- Key managers covered
- AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault (including Managed HSM), Google Cloud KMS and HashiCorp Vault's transit secrets engine. Each has its own page on this site with the exact operations and permissions. [P711-D01] [P711-D05] [P711-D09] [P711-D11] [HS2]
- What BYOK puts on you
- Access policy and, for imported keys, the original key material. AWS states that with imported key material you remain responsible for it. HashiCorp notes it is more secure to let Transit generate the key than to import one. [P711-D02] [P711-D11]
- What HYOK puts on you
- Running the key manager. AWS makes you responsible for the availability, durability and latency of key operations in an external key store. Google states it has no control over the availability of an externally managed key, and that reaching one over the internet can cause reliability, availability and latency problems. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
- The vendors' own caution on HYOK
- AWS writes that for most workloads the added operational burden and risk to availability and performance will exceed the perceived security benefit. Microsoft describes Managed HSM external key management as a last-resort option, built for compatible Azure services, with an SLA that does not cover end-to-end external key availability. [P711-D03] [P711-D07]
- If the key is unavailable
- Data keys cannot be unwrapped, so your tenant's data cannot be read until the key returns. Google documents a FAILED_PRECONDITION error when an external key is unavailable. AWS warns that if an external key is lost, ciphertext under it is unrecoverable. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
- Logging is yours to switch on
- Azure Key Vault logging is enabled by the customer. Vault auditing is disabled when a cluster is first initialized, and once audit devices are enabled Vault refuses requests it cannot record. [P711-D08] [P711-D12]
Where each HiveSilo capability meets BYOK and HYOK
Each row pairs a published HiveSilo capability with the key manager features that govern the data behind it. HiveSilo only asks for wrap and unwrap. Every other feature named here is one your own administrators operate, and none of them needs a further permission for HiveSilo.
| HiveSilo capability | BYOK feature it works with | What you gain |
|---|---|---|
| Client-controlled privacy and verification | Access rules on one key: AWS KMS grants, Azure role assignments, the Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter role, Vault policies | PII and private buyer data in your confidential environment sit under a key that only an identity you named can ask to unwrap. [P711-D13] [P711-D14] [P711-D15] [P711-D18] [HSF1] [HS3] |
| Buyer intelligence and three-tier qualification | Envelope encryption: AWS KMS Decrypt, Key Vault wrapKey, a Cloud KMS key encryption key, Vault transit data keys | Buyer scores and Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 qualification delivered into your environment are stored under data keys that only your key manager can unwrap. [P711-D01] [P711-D05] [P711-D09] [P711-D11] [HSF1] |
| Revenue Seeker | Key disable and revocation: deleting an AWS KMS grant, removing an Azure role assignment, disabling a Cloud KMS key version | Opportunities found across your authorized sources stay in your confidential environment, readable only while access you granted is in force. [P711-D13] [P711-D14] [P711-D17] [HSF1] |
| AI Governance & Control | Audit logs: AWS CloudTrail, Key Vault AuditEvent logging, Cloud Audit Logs, Vault audit devices | The people accountable for AI-assisted actions get an independent record, in your own systems, of each time the key behind that data was used. [P711-D04] [P711-D08] [P711-D12] [P711-D16] [HS6] |
| Client-controlled privacy and verification | Key import (BYOK): AWS KMS imported key material, Azure HSM-protected key import, Vault transit key import | You control access to your private business information down to the origin of the key material, and you keep the original where the vendor documents that you can. [P711-D02] [P711-D06] [P711-D11] [HSF1] |
| Client-controlled privacy and verification | External key stores (HYOK): AWS KMS external key stores and Google Cloud External Key Manager | Where your policy requires key material held outside the cloud provider, the vendors document the route and state plainly that availability becomes yours. Raise it when scoping. [P711-D03] [P711-D10] [HSF1] |
Which data your key protects, and where the wrap happens
In both models the key protects the data held for your tenant in your own confidential environment, including identifying data and the scored results delivered to you. HiveSilo's shared platform works with permitted non-PII signals and scores and holds no key that opens that data. Exactly what is held where is covered under agreement during setup and security review.
The data itself is encrypted with data keys and never travels to your key manager. Only a data key is sent to be wrapped or unwrapped. Under BYOK the cloud key manager in your account performs that operation. Under HYOK the cloud service passes it to the key manager you run, and the key material stays there. [P711-D03] [P711-D09] [HS3] [HS4]
What your BYOK team does
The connection is configuration in your own key manager plus activation on the HiveSilo side. These are the steps on your side. The page for each key manager gives the exact operations.
- Choose the model.Decide whether a key in a cloud key manager you control meets your policy (BYOK, with or without imported key material), or whether key material must stay in a key manager you operate (HYOK). [P711-D02] [P711-D03]
- Create a key for this purpose.Google's envelope guidance is to store key encryption keys centrally and wrap data keys with them. HashiCorp notes it is more secure to let Transit generate the key than to import one. [P711-D09] [P711-D11]
- Grant wrap and unwrap to one identity.AWS KMS: a grant on one KMS key. Azure Key Vault: the Key Vault Crypto Service Encryption User role. Google Cloud KMS: the Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter role on one key. Vault: a policy on the transit path, where policies are deny by default. [P711-D13] [P711-D14] [P711-D15] [P711-D18]
- Switch on audit logging.Azure Key Vault logging and Vault audit devices are off until you enable them. In Google Cloud, Encrypt and Decrypt are recorded in Data Access audit logs. AWS CloudTrail records cross-account key operations in the key owner's account. [P711-D04] [P711-D08] [P711-D12] [P711-D16]
- Run a revocation test.Withdraw access the way your key manager documents it, confirm the next unwrap is refused, then restore it. Google states that disabling a key version is typically consistent within one minute. Microsoft says to allow several minutes for role assignment changes. [P711-D14] [P711-D17]
- Under HYOK, name an owner for availability.AWS makes you responsible for the availability, durability and latency of key operations in an external key store. Google states it has no control over the availability of an externally managed key. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
HiveSilo's published typical deployment is approximately 72 hours to set up and 7 days to live mapping and go-live, subject to fit, customer readiness and agreed scope. The key manager steps above run on your own change process. [HSF1]
Who, what, when, where, how and why
- Who
- Enterprises whose security policy names customer managed keys, BYOK or HYOK for vendor-held data. Your key administrator chooses the model and grants the access. [P711-D02] [P711-D03] [HS3]
- What
- Wrap and unwrap requests for the data keys that protect your tenant's data. The requests carry data keys, not buyer records. [P711-D01] [P711-D05]
- When
- When a data key is created for your tenant and when one has to be unwrapped so your data can be read. With HYOK, your own key manager has to be reachable at that moment. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
- Where
- BYOK: in a key manager in your own cloud account. HYOK: in a key manager you operate, on your premises or wherever you run it. The audit record is written on your side in both. [P711-D03] [P711-D04] [P711-D08]
- How
- Outbound calls to your key manager's documented API, under an identity and permission you create. AWS states that keys in an external key store are used through the same APIs as any KMS key. [P711-D03] [P711-D05]
See the intelligence behind the next move
BYOK: your key in a cloud key manager.
Your key sits in a key manager in your own cloud account. HiveSilo protects your data with data keys and asks your key to wrap and unwrap them. AWS, Microsoft and Google each document this envelope pattern, and Google's guidance says the key encryption key never leaves Cloud KMS. [P711-D01] [P711-D05] [P711-D09]
Useful output: Data keys that can be unwrapped only by a call to your key manager.
HYOK: the key material stays with you.
The key lives in a key manager you run. AWS external key stores perform each operation in your external key manager through a proxy you provide. Google Cloud External Key Manager states that externally managed keys are never cached or stored within Google Cloud. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
Useful output: Key material that never leaves the key manager you operate.
An audit trail in your own systems.
Each key manager records use of the key on your side: AWS CloudTrail logs cross-account key operations in the key owner's account, Azure Key Vault writes KeyWrap and KeyUnwrap audit events to your storage account, and Vault audit devices record API requests in detail. [P711-D04] [P711-D08] [P711-D12]
Useful output: A record of each wrap and unwrap, held where your team already looks.
Policy says HYOK. Does the workload need it?
Illustrative workflow: a client's policy mentions hold your own key for sensitive data. Their security lead and their marketing lead have to decide which model applies to website buyer intelligence.
Start with BYOK / HYOK
The client's key manager already offers both routes. AWS and Google each document a standard key in the cloud service and an externally held key, and say plainly what the external route costs in availability and latency.
Bring the relevant context together
- The data classification the client's policy gives to pseudonymous buyer scores and signals.
- The vendor's own statement of who carries availability and latency under each model.
- Whether the client already operates an external key manager with staff to run it.
Make the decision
The security lead chooses BYOK in the cloud key manager for this data, and records that HYOK remains available if the classification changes.
A useful output
A tenant whose data keys are wrapped by the client's key, with each use recorded in the client's own logs.
Keep responsibility clear
The client's key administrator owns the key, the permission and the decision to revoke. HiveSilo is a caller with the access that administrator grants.
Hold and ask
Hold activation until a test revocation has been run and the client's logging is confirmed to record key use.
Record the outcome
Record the model chosen, the key identifier and the date of the revocation test in the client's own change log. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
Require control before AI acts.
A key is only a control if someone is named to use it.
Write down who may grant and revoke the key, and keep that authority separate from marketing and sales access. Agree what revocation means for the business: scoring for your tenant stops being readable until access is restored. Under HYOK, add an owner for the availability of the key manager itself, because the vendors place that responsibility on you.
Request
An AI proposes an action
Check
Policy and authority
Approve
Named owner, when required
Act
Within permitted scope
Record
Keep the action, outcome and accountable owner traceable.
Unclear authority? Hold the action.Resolve with the named, authorized owner before proceeding.
Controls apply to actions routed through the configured HiveSilo boundary.
Read the governance and escalation requirements
Make accountable authorization a condition of putting AI to work. HiveSilo describes an operating layer that combines buyer intelligence, customer-data privacy and governance. Your deployment should establish the responsible owner and permitted scope before an agent can change records, contact buyers or trigger campaigns.
HiveSilo documents policy checks before execution, default denial when authorization is unclear, human checkpoints, scoped stop controls and decision receipts. These controls apply to actions routed through its policy boundary. Keep decisions, required approvals and held actions traceable as the workflow progresses, then record the action, outcome and accountable owner. [HS6][HS7]
- Who
- Identify the acting agent or person and name the business owner accountable for this workflow.
- What
- Define the action and permitted data categories before execution.
- Where
- Specify the approved system, destination and customer custody boundary.
- How
- Require an approved execution path, access scope and applicable policy checks.
- When
- Set the permitted conditions and approval validity; recheck authority before a held action resumes.
- Why
- Record the business purpose and the basis for allowing, denying or holding the action.
An edge case should stop the affected action.
For the deployment, require unresolved authority, an unapproved destination or an out-of-policy action to remain on hold. A timeout or unanswered approval request must not become permission to proceed.
Who gets the question?
Agree a named owner and authorized delegate for each workflow. A proposed responsibility model is: sales for buyer outreach and lead handling; marketing for campaign spend and audiences; security or privacy for data-access exceptions; the platform owner for connector or runtime changes. Test the escalation route. If no authorized reviewer is available, keep the action held.
Named-owner routing is configured and demonstrated for each deployment. Governance covers actions routed through its configured boundary; external systems remain responsible for actions outside that scope.
Make responsibility part of the AI rollout.
Use the AI implementation layer to put policy checks, approval checkpoints and decision records around the actions in scope. Your enterprise agreement defines the legal responsibilities and any agreed liability allocation or transfer. [HS7][HS10]
Explore the AI implementation layer · How enterprise agreements govern the engagement
Your client list stays yours.
HiveSilo never holds your key, in either model.
Explore the security architectureYour client records stay with your business under HiveSilo’s published architecture.
How your data stays under your control
Under BYOK and HYOK the key stays in your key manager, which performs each wrap and unwrap. Requests carry data keys, not visitor or lead records. Customer identities stay in the environment you control; HiveSilo's shared platform works with permitted non-PII signals and scores. [P711-D03] [P711-D10] [HS3] [HS4] [HS4]
Your controlled environment
Your key stays in your own key manager
Identities and re-identifiable records stay here.
Your enclave. Your keys.Only permitted non-PII signals and scoresWrap and unwrap requests for data keys only
HiveSilo intelligence
HiveSilo: buyer data encrypted under keys you control
Published architecture. Confirm the data boundary for your deployment.
Customer-controlled keys
Documented BYOK options cover AWS, Azure and GCP. Review key ownership, revocation and the deployment's access policy with your security team. [HS3]
Protected processing
The architecture describes confidential computing and trusted execution environments. Request deployment-specific attestation and data-flow evidence for your CISO's review. [HS3]
Scoped destinations and actions
Agree which systems receive outputs and what actions are authorized. Keep identity handling within the documented customer boundary. [HS2][HS4]
Control through the full relationship
Review permitted use, export, retention, deletion and offboarding terms. Customer-controlled keys are one control; they do not establish every contractual exit right. [HS3][HS4]
Your key manager performs each wrap and unwrap and returns only the result. The requests carry data keys, not visitor or lead records. Customer identities stay in the environment you control, and HiveSilo's shared platform works with permitted non-PII signals and scores. Google's envelope guidance says not to use the same data key for two different users; your tenant's data keys are wrapped by your key alone.
A BYOK / HYOK review of HiveSilo should confirm that the identity can only wrap and unwrap, on one key. [P711-D03] [P711-D10] [HS3] [HS4]
Customer identity custody is separate from HiveSilo account, billing and support records. Re-identifiable pseudonymous data is not anonymous.
What you could gain.
BYOK and HYOK let security approve the buyer intelligence your revenue team wants, because the key that protects it stays under your control.
Explore HiveSilo case studiesContact HiveSiloSharper scoring. Clearer intent.
3,790 of 5,000 · UHNW buyer scoreIllustrative score
Score buying intent on your website while the scores stay readable only through a key you control.
Find more clients like your best.
4–6× · Reported conversion liftClosed-revenue outcomes
Extend what works to more sites, brands and regions under the same key policy your team already audits.
Put more of your budget to work.
Up to 31% · Reported ad-spend savingsBot and invalid-traffic filtering
Avoid a second key process to run: BYOK and HYOK both use the key manager you already operate.
Keep evolving your protection.
99.9999% · Bot detectionObserved client results
Keep invalid-traffic screening results under the same customer managed key as the rest of your tenant's data. Goal, not an achieved result: toward 99.9999999% bot detection as the hive evolves. Observed client results vary.
Find revenue in data you already own.
5–21% · Revenue lift from existing dataHiveSilo-reported client results
Hold historical buyer signals under your key, so later analysis of existing data stays within your control.
Published outcomes include client-reported results and illustrative, unaudited ranges. The owned-data revenue range was supplied by HiveSilo; request the measurement context in your briefing. Results vary.
Measure what matters
Define the result. Then require the evidence.
Focus on better-directed follow-up, less acquisition waste, protected customer identity custody and accountable AI execution. Agree the baseline, success measures and scope for your business.
- CEO: a clearer decision about the opportunities that merit attention.
- CFO: an agreed baseline, evaluation costs and attributable outcomes before any ROI claim.
- CTO: a demonstrated, permitted connection and a usable handoff into the agreed system.
- CISO: verified identity custody and pre-action authorization, with tested hold, approval and revocation behavior.
Explore HiveSilo’s published outcomes and the measurement context behind them. [HS5][HS8][HS9]
Make your next conversation count.
Bring your BYOK / HYOK workflow. Map the decision, the data you control and a measurable next step with HiveSilo.
Enterprise key management & security monitoring · Security, compliance, technology & operations
Mention BYOK / HYOK and your business question.
No client records or credentials.
A closer look,
when you need it.
Product scope, a practical workflow and source-backed answers for your team and its research tools.
Reviewed
Contact HiveSiloBYOK / HYOK connection & briefing scope
Agree the model, the key and the test.
Start with your policy: does it require a customer managed key, or key material held outside the cloud provider? Then name the key manager, create a key for this purpose, grant wrap and unwrap to the HiveSilo identity, switch on logging and run a revocation test before go-live.
Customer managed keys are available and are activated for each client on request. Public documentation establishes what each key manager supports; your own configuration, your agreement with that vendor and your agreement with HiveSilo determine the scope that is switched on.
When you review BYOK / HYOK options, read each vendor's own statement of who carries availability and latency. [P711-D03] [P711-D10] [HS3] [HS4]
[P711-D03] [P711-D08] [P711-D10] [HS10]
A useful fit when
Most useful where a security policy already names customer managed keys for vendor-held data.
- Enterprises that run AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS or HashiCorp Vault and want vendors under the same controls.
- Regulated organizations whose policy requires key material to stay in a key manager they operate.
- Security teams that want a tested, self-service way to end a vendor's access.
Consider the fit
- HYOK makes you responsible for the availability and latency of your key manager. If it is unreachable, your tenant's data cannot be read.
- AWS and Microsoft both describe the external route as suited to a narrow set of regulated workloads. BYOK in a cloud key manager meets many policies with less to operate.
- A Vault cluster you run has to be reachable by HiveSilo over a network path you approve.
- Logging of key use is something you enable in Azure Key Vault and in Vault.
In your enquiry, name BYOK / HYOK and the business decision. Please leave out client records, credentials and sensitive samples.
Eight questions before your briefing
1.Does HiveSilo connect to BYOK and HYOK key managers?
Yes. Customer managed keys are available and are activated for each client on request. The key managers covered are AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS and HashiCorp Vault, each called through its documented API. [P711-D01] [P711-D05] [P711-D09] [P711-D11] [HS2]
2.What is the difference between BYOK and HYOK?
With BYOK your key lives in a cloud key manager you control. With HYOK the key material stays in a key manager you operate, and the cloud service forwards each operation to it. AWS uses the term hold your own keys for its external key stores. [P711-D02] [P711-D03]
3.Does HiveSilo ever hold our key or read anything back?
No. HiveSilo sends a data key to be wrapped or unwrapped and receives only the result. It asks for no permission to manage keys or access rules and does not read your audit logs. Google's envelope guidance, for example, states that the key encryption key never leaves Cloud KMS. [P711-D09] [HS3]
4.What does HYOK make us responsible for?
The key manager's availability and latency. AWS states you are responsible for the availability, durability and latency of key operations in an external key store. Google states it has no control over the availability of an externally managed key. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
5.What happens if our key manager is down or we revoke the key?
Data keys cannot be unwrapped, so your tenant's data cannot be read until access returns. Google documents a FAILED_PRECONDITION error for an unavailable external key. AWS warns that a lost external key makes its ciphertext unrecoverable. [P711-D03] [P711-D10]
6.Which key manager features are in scope, and can we audit every use?
In scope: wrap and unwrap on one key, under the access rule your key manager provides. Auditing is in your own systems. AWS CloudTrail logs cross-account key operations in the key owner's account, Azure Key Vault logs KeyWrap and KeyUnwrap once you enable logging, Google records Encrypt and Decrypt in Data Access audit logs, and Vault audit devices record API requests once enabled. [P711-D04] [P711-D08] [P711-D12] [P711-D16]
7.Does Azure offer HYOK?
Microsoft documents Managed HSM external key management, which connects compatible Azure services to an HSM you operate outside Microsoft infrastructure and is described as a last-resort option. For HiveSilo on Azure, the documented route is wrapKey and unwrapKey on a key in your Key Vault or Managed HSM. [P711-D05] [P711-D07]
8.Is HiveSilo listed in a cloud marketplace or key management partner program?
No listing or partnership is claimed with any of the four vendors. The connection is set up directly against a key in your own key manager, with permission your administrator grants and can revoke. [P711-D06] [HS2]
Sources, scope & verification
- AWS KMS API Reference: GenerateDataKey [P711-D01]
AWS's documented envelope pattern: encrypt data with a data key outside AWS KMS, store the encrypted data key with the data, and call the Decrypt operation on the KMS key to recover the data key; a KMS key in another account is named by its key ARN.
Reviewed November 2026
- AWS KMS Developer Guide: Importing key material for AWS KMS keys [P711-D02]
A KMS key can be created without key material and the customer's own key material imported, a feature AWS says is often known as bring your own key (BYOK); the customer remains responsible for the key material while allowing AWS KMS to use a copy of it.
Reviewed November 2026
- AWS KMS Developer Guide: External key stores [P711-D03]
An external key store is backed by an external key manager the customer owns and manages outside AWS, reached through a customer-provided external key store proxy, a feature AWS calls hold your own keys (HYOK); the same APIs are used as for any KMS key; the customer is responsible for the availability, durability and latency of key operations; AWS suggests a network round-trip time of 35 milliseconds or less.
Reviewed November 2026
- AWS KMS Developer Guide: Logging AWS KMS API calls with AWS CloudTrail [P711-D04]
CloudTrail logs AWS KMS cryptographic operations; cross-account operations on KMS keys are logged in both the caller account and the KMS key owner account.
Reviewed November 2026
- Azure Key Vault REST API: wrap Key [P711-D05]
POST {vaultBaseUrl}/keys/{key-name}/{key-version}/wrapkey encrypts a symmetric key using a key encryption key stored in Azure Key Vault and requires the keys/wrapKey permission.
Reviewed November 2026
- Microsoft Learn: Import HSM-protected keys to Key Vault (BYOK) [P711-D06]
Microsoft's bring your own key process transfers a key from an on-premises HSM into Key Vault Premium or Managed HSM under a Key Exchange Key, so that only the encrypted key leaves the source HSM; it is available only for supported HSMs.
Reviewed November 2026
- Microsoft Learn: Azure Key Vault Managed HSM overview [P711-D07]
Managed HSM is single-tenant and uses FIPS 140-3 Level 3 validated HSMs; its external key management feature connects compatible Azure services' customer-managed-key encryption to an HSM the customer operates outside Microsoft infrastructure, is described as a last-resort option, and the Managed HSM SLA does not cover end-to-end external key availability.
Reviewed November 2026
- Microsoft Learn: Azure Key Vault logging [P711-D08]
When the customer enables logging, Key Vault writes AuditEvent records, including KeyWrap and KeyUnwrap operations with caller identity and IP address, to a storage account the customer provides.
Reviewed November 2026
- Google Cloud KMS documentation: Envelope encryption [P711-D09]
Google's envelope model: generate a data encryption key (DEK) locally, encrypt data with it, wrap the DEK with a key encryption key (KEK) in Cloud KMS and store the wrapped DEK with the data; the KEK never leaves Cloud KMS; do not use the same DEK for two different users; Encrypt and Decrypt accept at most 64 KiB.
Reviewed November 2026
- Google Cloud KMS documentation: Cloud External Key Manager [P711-D10]
Cloud EKM uses keys managed in a supported external key manager, including through direct calls to the Cloud KMS API; externally managed keys are never cached or stored within Google Cloud; Google has no control over the availability of the external key; communicating over the internet can cause reliability, availability and latency problems; an unavailable external key returns FAILED_PRECONDITION.
Reviewed November 2026
- HashiCorp Vault documentation: Transit secrets engine [P711-D11]
The transit secrets engine performs cryptographic functions without storing the data sent to it; datakey generation returns a high-entropy key encrypted with a named key; key import (BYOK) is supported, though HashiCorp states it is more secure to have Transit generate and manage the key within Vault.
Reviewed November 2026
- HashiCorp Vault documentation: Audit devices [P711-D12]
Vault audit devices record API requests and responses in detail; auditing is disabled when a new cluster is initialized; if no enabled audit device can record a request, Vault refuses to service it; most string values are written as a keyed hash (HMAC-SHA256) by default.
Reviewed November 2026
- AWS KMS Developer Guide: Grants in AWS KMS [P711-D13]
A grant allows a principal, including one in a different AWS account, to use exactly one KMS key for the grant operations listed; a grant can allow but not deny; deleting a grant eliminates all permissions it allowed.
Reviewed November 2026
- Microsoft Learn: Grant permission to applications to access an Azure key vault using Azure RBAC [P711-D14]
Access to Key Vault is managed by adding or removing Azure role assignments, including the built-in role Key Vault Crypto Service Encryption User; Microsoft recommends a vault per application per environment and says to allow several minutes for role assignments to refresh.
Reviewed November 2026
- Google Cloud KMS documentation: Permissions and roles [P711-D15]
The role Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter (roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter) provides the ability to use Cloud KMS resources for encrypt and decrypt operations only, and can be granted as low as a single CryptoKey.
Reviewed November 2026
- Google Cloud KMS documentation: Audit logging [P711-D16]
Cloud Audit Logs record Cloud KMS operations; the Encrypt and Decrypt methods need a DATA_READ permission and so generate Data Access audit logs, and the page links to how Data Access audit logs are enabled.
Reviewed November 2026
- Google Cloud KMS documentation: Enable and disable key versions [P711-D17]
While a key version is disabled, data encrypted with it cannot be accessed until it is re-enabled; disabling is typically consistent within one minute; IAM changes typically take effect within seconds or minutes.
Reviewed November 2026
- HashiCorp Vault documentation: Policies [P711-D18]
Vault policies grant or forbid access to paths and operations; policies are deny by default, so an empty policy grants no permission.
Reviewed November 2026
- HiveSilo capability overview [HSF1]
Published HiveSilo capabilities: buyer intelligence with Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 qualification, Revenue Seeker, offline conversion feedback, AI Governance & Control, the AI implementation layer, business insights and oversight, and client-controlled privacy and verification; typical deployment of approximately 72 hours to set up and 7 days to go-live, subject to fit, readiness and scope.
Reviewed November 2026
- HiveSilo: industry coverage [HS0]
First-party description of buyer intelligence across 12 luxury niches.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: platform [HS1]
Published intent, sales-prioritization and traffic-quality capabilities.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: integration scope [HS2]
Named destinations, scoped activation and customer-controlled dispatch.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: security architecture [HS3]
Documented confidential processing, BYOK and customer control.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: data handling [HS4]
Customer identity custody, pseudonymous-data boundaries and separate account records.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: published outcomes [HS5]
Existing first-party outcomes material, with client-reported and illustrative descriptions.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: AI agentic governance [HS6]
Published pre-action policy checks, default denial, human checkpoints, scoped stop controls and governance receipts.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: AI implementation layer [HS7]
Published combined implementation model for intelligence, confidential processing and AI governance.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: bot-detection results and buyer-score specimen [HS8]
The homepage presents 99.9999% bot detection as observed client results, 99.9999999% as a goal, and a 3,790-of-5,000 UHNW buyer-score specimen.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: owned-data revenue result briefing [HS9]
HiveSilo supplied a 5–21% client revenue increase range for existing-data workflows in October 2026.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: enterprise agreements and responsibility [HS10]
Signed enterprise agreements govern the engagement and take precedence over website summaries.
Reviewed October 2026
Vendor sources describe their own product. The workflows on this page describe a HiveSilo application, scoped to customer permissions, contracts and the selected product edition.
HiveSilo’s reported outcomes retain their original measurement context; the illustrative score and future bot-detection goal are identified in the outcomes section.
Independent HiveSilo use-case page. BYOK / HYOK is identified to explain the workflow; no endorsement, certification or partnership is implied.
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