Cloud KMS. Your key stands in front of your HiveSilo data.
Google Cloud KMS already holds the keys your security team controls. HiveSilo asks that key to wrap and unwrap the data keys protecting your data, through the encrypt and decrypt methods Google documents, under an IAM role you grant and can remove.
Start with a conversation. No client records needed.

A vendor says your data is encrypted. Who holds the key?
Encryption at rest answers one question. Who can use the key, and who can stop its use, is a different one.
What does a security team need before a vendor stores its data?
A buyer-intelligence platform holds scores and buyer signals for your website. Your security team will ask where the encryption key lives, who can call it, how access is withdrawn and where each use is recorded. If the answer is inside the vendor, your team has to take the answer on trust.
Google Cloud KMS is built for exactly this control: keys in your own project, IAM on a single key, key versions you can disable and audit logs for each call. HiveSilo does not replace any of it. It makes its outbound calls to the key you name, so the controls you already operate apply to your HiveSilo data as well.
A Google Cloud KMS review should start with the keys, IAM bindings and audit logging your team already operates. [P714-D04] [P714-D06] [HS3] [HS4]
Keep the key in your project. Let HiveSilo ask for it.
HiveSilo uses envelope encryption. Data keys protect your data, and your Cloud KMS key wraps those data keys. The wrapping key stays in Cloud KMS.
Talk through your use case- Who may use the key.
- Grant one role on one key to the HiveSilo service identity, and nothing wider.
- When use stops.
- Remove the IAM binding or disable the key version, on your own schedule.
- What you can prove.
- Read each encrypt and decrypt call in your own Google Cloud audit logs.
AvailableThe connection is activated for each client on request, against a key in that client's own Google Cloud project, with the IAM role and key their administrator approves.
How HiveSilo connects to Google Cloud KMS
Google Cloud KMS holds the key your security team controls. HiveSilo uses envelope encryption: your key wraps and unwraps the data keys that protect the data in your per-tenant confidential environment, through the documented cryptoKeys.encrypt and cryptoKeys.decrypt methods, under one IAM role you grant on one key. The key never leaves Cloud KMS, you can disable it, and each use appears in your own audit logs. [P714-D01] [P714-D05] [HSF1] [HS3]
What your security team sees in the audit log
- Log type
- Data Access audit log
- Service
- cloudkms.googleapis.com
- Method
- Decrypt
- Key
- your-key, in your-key-ring, in your project and location
- Caller
- HiveSilo service identity a1b2…
What the entry means
One data key unwrapped under the binding on this key
The request carried a wrapped data key, not visitor data. The same Logs Explorer filter lists every wrap and unwrap request for the period you choose.
What HiveSilo sends and the route Cloud KMS documents
Every row below names a method or control in Google's public Cloud KMS documentation. HiveSilo calls the Cloud KMS API outbound and makes two kinds of call: encrypt, to wrap a data key, and decrypt, to unwrap one. It does not read your key material, your IAM policy or your audit logs, and it does not ask Google to call into your systems.
| What HiveSilo asks for | In Cloud KMS | Documented route |
|---|---|---|
| Wrap a new data key | Your symmetric key, purpose ENCRYPT_DECRYPT | POST to the cryptoKeys.encrypt method on cloudkms.googleapis.com. It requires cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.useToEncrypt and accepts plaintext no larger than 64KiB, which suits a data key. [P714-D01] [P714-D05] |
| Unwrap a data key before reading your data | The same key; Cloud KMS chooses the right version | POST to the cryptoKeys.decrypt method, which requires cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.useToDecrypt on the key. [P714-D02] |
| Permission to make those two calls | An IAM binding on the key | Your administrator grants roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter to the HiveSilo service identity on the key directly. Only principals with the Owner or Cloud KMS Admin role can grant or revoke it. [P714-D03] [P714-D04] |
| Nothing further: each call leaves a record | Data Access audit logs in your project | Encrypt and Decrypt are listed as DATA_READ methods. Filter on protoPayload.serviceName="cloudkms.googleapis.com" in Logs Explorer. [P714-D06] |
| The same calls against an externally held key | A Cloud EKM key backed by your external key manager | Cloud EKM keys use the same API. Google states that externally managed keys are never cached or stored within Google Cloud. [P714-D08] [P714-D01] |
- Access you grant
- One predefined role, roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter, on one key. IAM roles set higher in the hierarchy are inherited by every key beneath, so Google advises granting on the lowest object. [P714-D03] [P714-D04]
- How to revoke
- Remove the binding with gcloud kms keys remove-iam-policy-binding, or disable the key version. Google says IAM changes typically take effect within seconds or minutes and that disabling a key version is typically consistent within one minute. [P714-D04] [P714-D07]
- Disable is reversible, destruction is not immediate
- A disabled key version can be re-enabled. A version scheduled for destruction stays in that state for 30 days by default and can be restored to disabled during that period. [P714-D10]
- Limits to plan for
- Quotas are counted in tokens. Software usage is 6,000,000 tokens per minute with soft enforcement, and each cryptographic operation on a software key uses 100 tokens. Google gives February 2026 as the date these metrics took effect. [P714-D09]
- If you use Cloud EKM
- External KMS usage is 10,000 tokens per second with hard enforcement. Google states it has no control over the availability of an externally managed key, and Cloud KMS returns FAILED_PRECONDITION when the external key is unavailable. [P714-D08] [P714-D09]
Where each HiveSilo capability meets Cloud KMS
Each row pairs a published HiveSilo capability with the Cloud KMS feature that governs the data behind it. HiveSilo only asks the key to wrap and unwrap data keys. Every control in the middle column is operated by your own team.
| HiveSilo capability | Cloud KMS feature it works with | What you gain |
|---|---|---|
| Buyer intelligence and three-tier qualification | cryptoKeys.encrypt and cryptoKeys.decrypt on a symmetric key with purpose ENCRYPT_DECRYPT | Scoring results delivered into your confidential environment, including the Tier 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3 qualification, sit under data keys that only your key can unwrap. [P714-D01] [P714-D02] [P714-D05] [HSF1] [HS3] |
| Client-controlled privacy and verification | Cloud EKM keys, reached over the internet or through a VPC | The key that protects identifying data in your confidential environment can live in an external key manager you run. Google states such keys are never cached or stored within Google Cloud. [P714-D08] [HSF1] [HS3] |
| AI Governance & Control | An IAM binding of roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter on a single key, granted and revoked only by an Owner or Cloud KMS Admin | People you name hold the authority to allow or stop key use, and HiveSilo can do only what that one binding permits. [P714-D03] [P714-D04] [HS6] |
| Business insights and oversight | Data Access audit logs for the Cloud KMS service | Your audit and oversight teams read each wrap and unwrap in your own project, in Logs Explorer, without asking HiveSilo for a report. [P714-D06] [P714-D13] [HSF1] |
| Client-controlled privacy and verification | Key version states: disable and re-enable | Disabling the key version stops the protected data being read until you re-enable it. [P714-D07] [P714-D10] [HSF1] [HS4] |
| Revenue Seeker | Rotation schedules, and regional or multi-regional key locations | Revenue Seeker works inside your confidential environment, which HiveSilo cannot see. The data there sits under a key in the location you choose, rotated on the schedule you set. [P714-D11] [P714-D12] [HSF1] [HS3] |
Which data the key protects, and where the wrap happens
The key protects the data held in your own confidential environment, including identifying data and the scored results delivered to you. HiveSilo's shared platform works only with permitted non-PII signals and scores. Exactly what is held where is covered under agreement during setup and security review.
The data is encrypted with data keys. Each data key is sent to your Cloud KMS key to be wrapped. Before the data is read, the wrapped data key goes back to Cloud KMS to be unwrapped. The wrap and the unwrap both happen inside Cloud KMS, or in your external key manager behind Cloud EKM. Your key material is never sent to HiveSilo. [P714-D05] [HS3] [HS4]
What your Cloud KMS team does
The connection is configuration in your Google Cloud project plus activation on the HiveSilo side. These are the steps on your side.
- Choose the location and create the key.Pick a regional, multi-regional or global location; Cloud KMS resources cannot be moved after creation. Create a key ring and a symmetric key. The quickstart uses gcloud kms keys create with --purpose "encryption", which gives a key with purpose ENCRYPT_DECRYPT. [P714-D12] [P714-D14]
- Set a rotation schedule.Google recommends rotating symmetric keys automatically on a regular schedule. Rotation creates a new key version and leaves previous versions active, so data keys wrapped earlier can still be unwrapped. [P714-D11]
- Grant one role on that key.A principal with the Owner or Cloud KMS Admin role runs gcloud kms keys add-iam-policy-binding to give the HiveSilo service identity roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter on the key itself. [P714-D03] [P714-D04]
- Enable Data Access audit logs for Cloud KMS.Google states these logs are disabled by default for most services and must be enabled explicitly. Encrypt and Decrypt are DATA_READ methods, so they are recorded once the logs are on. Enabling them can add log usage charges. [P714-D13] [P714-D06]
- Check the first calls in Logs Explorer.Filter on protoPayload.serviceName="cloudkms.googleapis.com" and confirm that the wrap and unwrap requests appear against the key you named. [P714-D06]
- Agree who may stop key use.Record who may disable a key version or remove the binding, and tell HiveSilo before a planned test. While a key version is disabled, data encrypted with it cannot be accessed. [P714-D04] [P714-D07]
HiveSilo's published typical deployment is approximately 72 hours to set up and 7 days to live mapping and go-live, subject to fit, customer readiness and agreed scope. The Cloud KMS steps above run on your own change process. [HSF1]
Who, what, when, where, how and why
- Who
- Enterprises whose security team runs keys in Google Cloud KMS and wants the same control over data a vendor holds for them. A principal with the Owner or Cloud KMS Admin role grants the access. [P714-D04]
- What
- Requests to wrap and unwrap data keys. HiveSilo does not send your visitor data to Cloud KMS; a wrap request carries a data key, which fits within the 64KiB plaintext limit. [P714-D01] [P714-D05]
- When
- When HiveSilo needs a data key for your tenant's data: a wrap when a key is created, an unwrap before protected data is read. [P714-D05] [HS3]
- Where
- On a key in your own Google Cloud project and location. The key encryption key never leaves Cloud KMS, and with Cloud EKM the key material stays in your external key manager. [P714-D05] [P714-D08]
- How
- Outbound calls to cryptoKeys.encrypt and cryptoKeys.decrypt, authorized by an IAM binding on the key. [P714-D01] [P714-D02] [P714-D03]
- Why
- So the decision to let a vendor read your data rests on a control you operate, and so each use of the key is recorded where your auditors already look. [P714-D06] [HS3]
See the intelligence behind the next move
Envelope encryption on the documented methods.
HiveSilo protects your data with data keys and asks your key to wrap them with cryptoKeys.encrypt and unwrap them with cryptoKeys.decrypt. Google describes this model and states that the key encryption key never leaves Cloud KMS. [P714-D01] [P714-D02] [P714-D05]
Useful output: Data keys that are only usable while your key answers.
One role, on one key.
The predefined role roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter carries the two permissions the calls need. Google's IAM guidance is to grant the most limited permissions on the lowest object in the hierarchy, which here is the key itself. [P714-D03] [P714-D04]
Useful output: A single IAM binding your administrator can read and remove.
A record in your own project.
Encrypt and Decrypt are DATA_READ methods, which generate Data Access audit logs for the Cloud KMS service. Your team reads them in Logs Explorer alongside the rest of your Google Cloud audit trail. [P714-D06]
Useful output: An audit entry for each wrap and unwrap request.
An access review asks: can we cut the vendor off today?
Illustrative workflow: during a quarterly access review, a security lead wants to show that HiveSilo's use of the company key can be stopped and that the stop is visible.
Start with Google Cloud KMS
Google Cloud KMS provides the key, the IAM binding, key version states and audit logging. Those are the controls used in every step below.
Bring the relevant context together
- The IAM policy on the key, showing the one binding granted to the HiveSilo service identity.
- Data Access audit log entries for Encrypt and Decrypt on that key.
- The key version's current state.
Make the decision
The security lead disables the key version in a planned test window, confirms that unwrap requests stop succeeding, then re-enables it.
A useful output
A dated record, in the company's own logs, that the key controls access to the HiveSilo data it protects.
Keep responsibility clear
The key's administrators in your Google Cloud organization decide who may use the key and when. HiveSilo only makes the calls the binding allows.
Hold and ask
Plan the test with HiveSilo first. While the key version is disabled, data protected by it cannot be read, so scoring and delivery for your tenant pause until it is re-enabled.
Record the outcome
Keep the audit log entries and the change record for the key version with your access review evidence. [P714-D04] [P714-D06] [P714-D07] [P714-D10]
Require control before AI acts.
The key is a control point, and control points need owners.
Name who may change the IAM policy on the key, who may disable a key version and who reviews the audit logs. Google's guidance separates the people who administer keys from the identities that use them. Treat revocation as a deliberate act with a named approver, because it stops HiveSilo reading the data that key protects.
Request
An AI proposes an action
Check
Policy and authority
Approve
Named owner, when required
Act
Within permitted scope
Record
Keep the action, outcome and accountable owner traceable.
Unclear authority? Hold the action.Resolve with the named, authorized owner before proceeding.
Controls apply to actions routed through the configured HiveSilo boundary.
Read the governance and escalation requirements
Make accountable authorization a condition of putting AI to work. HiveSilo describes an operating layer that combines buyer intelligence, customer-data privacy and governance. Your deployment should establish the responsible owner and permitted scope before an agent can change records, contact buyers or trigger campaigns.
HiveSilo documents policy checks before execution, default denial when authorization is unclear, human checkpoints, scoped stop controls and decision receipts. These controls apply to actions routed through its policy boundary. Keep decisions, required approvals and held actions traceable as the workflow progresses, then record the action, outcome and accountable owner. [HS6][HS7]
- Who
- Identify the acting agent or person and name the business owner accountable for this workflow.
- What
- Define the action and permitted data categories before execution.
- Where
- Specify the approved system, destination and customer custody boundary.
- How
- Require an approved execution path, access scope and applicable policy checks.
- When
- Set the permitted conditions and approval validity; recheck authority before a held action resumes.
- Why
- Record the business purpose and the basis for allowing, denying or holding the action.
An edge case should stop the affected action.
For the deployment, require unresolved authority, an unapproved destination or an out-of-policy action to remain on hold. A timeout or unanswered approval request must not become permission to proceed.
Who gets the question?
Agree a named owner and authorized delegate for each workflow. A proposed responsibility model is: sales for buyer outreach and lead handling; marketing for campaign spend and audiences; security or privacy for data-access exceptions; the platform owner for connector or runtime changes. Test the escalation route. If no authorized reviewer is available, keep the action held.
Named-owner routing is configured and demonstrated for each deployment. Governance covers actions routed through its configured boundary; external systems remain responsible for actions outside that scope.
Make responsibility part of the AI rollout.
Use the AI implementation layer to put policy checks, approval checkpoints and decision records around the actions in scope. Your enterprise agreement defines the legal responsibilities and any agreed liability allocation or transfer. [HS7][HS10]
Explore the AI implementation layer · How enterprise agreements govern the engagement
Your client list stays yours.
Your key material stays in Google Cloud KMS, or in your external key manager behind Cloud EKM.
Explore the security architectureYour client records stay with your business under HiveSilo’s published architecture.
How your data stays under your control
Key material stays in your Google Cloud KMS key, or in your external key manager behind Cloud EKM. HiveSilo sends data keys to be wrapped and unwrapped, not visitor data. Customer identities stay in the client-controlled environment; HiveSilo's shared platform receives permitted non-PII signals and scores. [P714-D04] [P714-D06] [HS3] [HS4] [HS4]
Your controlled environment
Your key stays in Google Cloud KMS
Identities and re-identifiable records stay here.
Your enclave. Your keys.Only permitted non-PII signals and scoresWrap and unwrap requests for data keys
HiveSilo intelligence
HiveSilo: data protected under your key
Published architecture. Confirm the data boundary for your deployment.
Customer-controlled keys
Documented BYOK options cover AWS, Azure and GCP. Review key ownership, revocation and the deployment's access policy with your security team. [HS3]
Protected processing
The architecture describes confidential computing and trusted execution environments. Request deployment-specific attestation and data-flow evidence for your CISO's review. [HS3]
Scoped destinations and actions
Agree which systems receive outputs and what actions are authorized. Keep identity handling within the documented customer boundary. [HS2][HS4]
Control through the full relationship
Review permitted use, export, retention, deletion and offboarding terms. Customer-controlled keys are one control; they do not establish every contractual exit right. [HS3][HS4]
HiveSilo sends data keys to be wrapped and wrapped keys to be unwrapped. It does not send visitor data to Cloud KMS and it does not receive your key material. Customer identities stay in the client-controlled environment, and HiveSilo's shared platform works with permitted non-PII signals and scores.
A Google Cloud KMS review of the connection should confirm that the HiveSilo service identity holds one role on one key. [P714-D04] [P714-D06] [HS3] [HS4]
Customer identity custody is separate from HiveSilo account, billing and support records. Re-identifiable pseudonymous data is not anonymous.
What you could gain.
Run HiveSilo's buyer intelligence on data whose data keys are wrapped by a Google Cloud KMS key that your team grants, audits and can withdraw.
Explore HiveSilo case studiesContact HiveSiloSharper scoring. Clearer intent.
3,790 of 5,000 · UHNW buyer scoreIllustrative score
Buyer scores for your website are stored under data keys that your Cloud KMS key wraps.
Find more clients like your best.
4–6× · Reported conversion liftClosed-revenue outcomes
Extend what works to more sites or brands without widening who can use the key: one binding, on one key.
Put more of your budget to work.
Up to 31% · Reported ad-spend savingsBot and invalid-traffic filtering
Skip a separate key system for one vendor; your existing Cloud KMS key, IAM and logs cover it.
Keep evolving your protection.
99.9999% · Bot detectionObserved client results
Bot and invalid-traffic evidence is protected by the same key, so the record your teams rely on sits under your control. Goal, not an achieved result: toward 99.9999999% bot detection as the hive evolves. Observed client results vary.
Find revenue in data you already own.
5–21% · Revenue lift from existing dataHiveSilo-reported client results
Older session data stays readable for analysis only while your key answers, which makes retention a decision you enforce.
Published outcomes include client-reported results and illustrative, unaudited ranges. The owned-data revenue range was supplied by HiveSilo; request the measurement context in your briefing. Results vary.
Measure what matters
Define the result. Then require the evidence.
Focus on better-directed follow-up, less acquisition waste, protected customer identity custody and accountable AI execution. Agree the baseline, success measures and scope for your business.
- CEO: a clearer decision about the opportunities that merit attention.
- CFO: an agreed baseline, evaluation costs and attributable outcomes before any ROI claim.
- CTO: a demonstrated, permitted connection and a usable handoff into the agreed system.
- CISO: verified identity custody and pre-action authorization, with tested hold, approval and revocation behavior.
Explore HiveSilo’s published outcomes and the measurement context behind them. [HS5][HS8][HS9]
Make your next conversation count.
Bring your Google Cloud KMS workflow. Map the decision, the data you control and a measurable next step with HiveSilo.
Enterprise key management & security monitoring · Security, compliance, technology & operations
Mention Google Cloud KMS and your business question.
No client records or credentials.
A closer look,
when you need it.
Product scope, a practical workflow and source-backed answers for your team and its research tools.
Reviewed
Contact HiveSiloGoogle Cloud KMS connection & briefing scope
Agree the key, the role and the review.
Confirm the project, location, key ring and key, and whether the key is software, HSM or Cloud EKM backed. Your administrator grants roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter on that key to the HiveSilo service identity and decides how Data Access audit logs are kept.
The connection is available and is activated for each client on request. Public documentation establishes what Cloud KMS supports; your Google Cloud configuration, your agreements with Google and your agreement with HiveSilo determine the scope that is switched on.
When you review Google Cloud KMS with HiveSilo, ask who approves revocation and what stops while the key is disabled. [P714-D04] [P714-D06] [HS3] [HS4]
[P714-D03] [P714-D04] [P714-D06] [HS10]
A useful fit when
Most useful where a security team already runs Google Cloud KMS and expects vendors to work under its keys.
- Enterprises with a key-management policy that requires customer-managed keys for vendor-held data.
- Teams that review Cloud KMS audit logs and want vendor key use in the same place.
- Organizations that back keys with Cloud EKM and accept responsibility for the external key manager's availability.
Consider the fit
- Disabling the key version or removing the binding stops HiveSilo reading the data that key protects until access is restored.
- Confirm that Data Access audit logs for Cloud KMS are enabled and retained in your project if you rely on them as evidence.
- With Cloud EKM, quotas are hard-enforced and availability of the external key is outside Google's control.
In your enquiry, name Google Cloud KMS and the business decision. Please leave out client records, credentials and sensitive samples.
Eight questions before your briefing
1.Does HiveSilo connect to Google Cloud KMS?
Yes. The Google Cloud KMS connection is available and is activated for each client on request. HiveSilo calls the documented encrypt and decrypt methods on a key in your project, under an IAM role you grant. [P714-D01] [P714-D02] [HS2]
2.Which Cloud KMS features are in scope?
Two methods, cryptoKeys.encrypt to wrap a data key and cryptoKeys.decrypt to unwrap it, on a symmetric key. They work with software, HSM and Cloud EKM keys. IAM, key version states, rotation, locations and audit logging stay under your control and apply as Google documents them. [P714-D01] [P714-D02] [P714-D08] [P714-D11] [P714-D12]
3.Which IAM role does HiveSilo need?
roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter, granted on the key itself. Google advises granting the most limited permissions on the lowest object in the resource hierarchy. [P714-D03] [P714-D04]
4.How do we revoke HiveSilo's access?
Remove the IAM binding with gcloud kms keys remove-iam-policy-binding, or disable the key version. Google says IAM changes typically take effect within seconds or minutes and disabling is typically consistent within one minute. [P714-D04] [P714-D07]
5.Where do we see each use of the key?
In your project's Data Access audit logs for the Cloud KMS service. Encrypt and Decrypt are DATA_READ methods; filter on protoPayload.serviceName="cloudkms.googleapis.com". Google states Data Access audit logs are disabled by default for most services, so your team enables them first. [P714-D06] [P714-D13]
6.Does HiveSilo send our data to Cloud KMS?
No. HiveSilo follows the envelope model Google describes: data is encrypted with a data key, and only that data key is sent to Cloud KMS to be wrapped. The encrypt method accepts no more than 64KiB. [P714-D01] [P714-D05]
7.Can the key be held outside Google with Cloud EKM?
Yes. Cloud EKM keys are called through the same API. Google states that externally managed keys are never cached or stored within Google Cloud, and that it has no control over the external key's availability. [P714-D08]
8.Does HiveSilo read anything back from Cloud KMS?
Only the result of its own two calls: a wrapped data key from encrypt and the unwrapped data key from decrypt. The role you grant carries the useToEncrypt and useToDecrypt permissions. HiveSilo does not read your key material, your IAM policy or your audit logs. [P714-D01] [P714-D02] [P714-D03]
Sources, scope & verification
- Cloud Key Management Service API reference: Method cryptoKeys.encrypt [P714-D01]
POST https://cloudkms.googleapis.com/v1/{name=projects/*/locations/*/keyRings/*/cryptoKeys/**}:encrypt requires the cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.useToEncrypt permission, needs a key with purpose ENCRYPT_DECRYPT, and accepts plaintext no larger than 64KiB (8KiB combined with additional authenticated data for HSM keys).
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud Key Management Service API reference: Method cryptoKeys.decrypt [P714-D02]
The cryptoKeys.decrypt method decrypts data protected by cryptoKeys.encrypt and requires the cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.useToDecrypt permission on the key.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Permissions and roles [P714-D03]
The predefined role roles/cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter carries the useToEncrypt and useToDecrypt permissions; separate encrypter-only and decrypter-only roles are also listed.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Access control with IAM [P714-D04]
IAM roles can be granted on a key directly, or on a key ring, project, folder or organization and inherited; only principals with the Owner or Cloud KMS Admin role can grant or revoke access; access is removed with gcloud kms keys remove-iam-policy-binding.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Envelope encryption [P714-D05]
Describes envelope encryption: a data encryption key generated locally is wrapped by a key encryption key that never leaves Cloud KMS; the maximum input for Encrypt and Decrypt is 64 KiB.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Cloud Key Management Service audit logging [P714-D06]
Encrypt and Decrypt are DATA_READ methods, which generate Data Access audit logs; the logs are found with the filter protoPayload.serviceName="cloudkms.googleapis.com"; the page links to enabling Data Access audit logs.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Enable and disable key versions [P714-D07]
While a key version is disabled, data encrypted with it cannot be accessed; disabling is typically consistent within one minute, and IAM operations typically take effect within seconds or minutes.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Cloud External Key Manager [P714-D08]
With Cloud EKM, externally managed keys are never cached or stored within Google Cloud; Google has no control over the availability of the external key, and Cloud KMS returns a FAILED_PRECONDITION error when it is unavailable.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Quotas [P714-D09]
Quotas count tokens: Software usage is 6,000,000 tokens per minute with soft enforcement, External KMS usage is 10,000 tokens per second with hard enforcement, and each cryptographic operation on a software or external key uses 100 tokens; the page gives February 2026 as the effective date of these metrics.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Key version states [P714-D10]
A DISABLED key version may not be used but can be re-enabled; a version scheduled for destruction spends 30 days in that state by default and can be restored to disabled within that period.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Key rotation [P714-D11]
Google recommends rotating symmetric keys automatically on a regular schedule; rotating creates new key versions but does not re-encrypt data and does not disable or delete previous key versions, which remain active until destroyed; automatic rotation is not supported for asymmetric keys.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Cloud KMS locations [P714-D12]
Cloud KMS resources can be created in regional locations, multi-regional locations or the global location; key material for Cloud KMS and Cloud HSM keys is confined to the selected region, and resources cannot be moved to a different location after creation.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud Logging documentation: Enable Data Access audit logs [P714-D13]
Data Access audit logs are disabled by default for all services except some BigQuery services and must be explicitly enabled in the Google Cloud console or through the API; enabling them can add log usage charges.
Reviewed November 2026
- Cloud KMS documentation: Quickstart, create encryption keys with Cloud KMS [P714-D14]
Shows gcloud kms keyrings create and gcloud kms keys create with --purpose "encryption", which produces a key listed with purpose ENCRYPT_DECRYPT, after the Cloud KMS API is enabled with gcloud services enable cloudkms.googleapis.com.
Reviewed November 2026
- HiveSilo capability overview [HSF1]
Published HiveSilo capabilities: buyer intelligence with Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 qualification, Revenue Seeker, offline conversion feedback and outcome measurement, AI Governance & Control, business insights and oversight, and client-controlled privacy; typical deployment of approximately 72 hours to set up and 7 days to go-live, subject to fit, readiness and scope.
Reviewed November 2026
- HiveSilo: industry coverage [HS0]
First-party description of buyer intelligence across 12 luxury niches.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: platform [HS1]
Published intent, sales-prioritization and traffic-quality capabilities.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: integration scope [HS2]
Named destinations, scoped activation and customer-controlled dispatch.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: security architecture [HS3]
Documented confidential processing, BYOK and customer control.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: data handling [HS4]
Customer identity custody, pseudonymous-data boundaries and separate account records.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: published outcomes [HS5]
Existing first-party outcomes material, with client-reported and illustrative descriptions.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: AI agentic governance [HS6]
Published pre-action policy checks, default denial, human checkpoints, scoped stop controls and governance receipts.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: AI implementation layer [HS7]
Published combined implementation model for intelligence, confidential processing and AI governance.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: bot-detection results and buyer-score specimen [HS8]
The homepage presents 99.9999% bot detection as observed client results, 99.9999999% as a goal, and a 3,790-of-5,000 UHNW buyer-score specimen.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: owned-data revenue result briefing [HS9]
HiveSilo supplied a 5–21% client revenue increase range for existing-data workflows in October 2026.
Reviewed October 2026
- HiveSilo: enterprise agreements and responsibility [HS10]
Signed enterprise agreements govern the engagement and take precedence over website summaries.
Reviewed October 2026
Vendor sources describe their own product. The workflows on this page describe a HiveSilo application, scoped to customer permissions, contracts and the selected product edition.
HiveSilo’s reported outcomes retain their original measurement context; the illustrative score and future bot-detection goal are identified in the outcomes section.
Independent HiveSilo use-case page. Google Cloud KMS is identified to explain the workflow; no endorsement, certification or partnership is implied.
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